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Private sources – out of pocket payments and private insurance – constitute an 
increasingly large share of total health care expenditures in most developed countries with 
predominantly public health insurance systems (Propper and Green, 1999). To an observer 
from outside the world of health care, there would appear to be very little novel, or worth 
discussion, about a delivery system that combines public and private financing.  In modern 
economies, mixed financing of basic needs is the norm.  In some cases, needs-based public 
financing guarantees a floor of some good (food, housing).  Private funds then finance 
purchases for those with incomes above the need threshold.  In some cases, the government 
provides a universally available basic allocation and actively encourages the purchase of 
added supplemental private coverage (retirement and disability income support).  In other 
cases, government provides a package of services viewed as adequate by most consumers but 
permits those who wish to do so to purchase additional services (education, security).  Why 
might such a mix – or a growing private share in that mix – be undesirable in the case of 
health care?  
In this paper, I explore the possible bases of such an argument from an economic 
perspective.  I base my analysis on the assumption that private purchases should be limited if 
such purchases make non-purchasers, worse-off.  That is, there is an economic rationale for 
limiting supplementary purchases if – but only if -- such purchases generate significant 
negative externalities.   
Framing the issue in terms of negative externalities raises a second set of questions about 
how government should respond to these externalities.  The debate generally asks whether 
purchases should be permitted or prohibited.  I argue that, in this context, the best response to 
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their purchasers.  Taxation, I assert, will improve the welfare of both purchasers and non-
purchasers relative to an outright prohibition. 
1.  The Demand for Private Services in the Context of Public Funding 
The first step in understanding how private purchases might affect non-purchasers is to 
consider why  people might be willing to pay for (that is, demand) such services.  Below, I 
consider two possible sources of a willingness to pay for private services in a publicly-
financed system.  
One rationale for private insurance depends on the existence of long waiting lists.  Cross-
national evidence suggests that some publicly-financed systems have reduced or eliminated 
such waiting lists (Flood, Stabile, and Kontic, 2005; Siciliani and Hurst, 2004).  The 
elimination of waiting lists, however, is likely to be quite costly (Siciliani and Hurst, 2004; 
Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1989).  Moreover, a willingness to pay for supplemental purchases 
is endemic to publicly-financed health care systems and cannot be fully addressed simply by 
improving the efficiency of the public system.   
a.  Political Economy of Public Financing 
The most straightforward reason to expect a willingness to pay for private services in a 
publicly-financed system is that people differ in their incomes and in their willingness to pay 
for health care services.  Numerous studies at both the individual, regional, and national 
levels suggest that the income elasticity of demand for health care services is positive – 
higher income people demand more health care services than do lower income people.  
Estimates of the elasticity range from 0.22 in individual analyses (Manning and Marquis, 
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likely reflects a willingness (and ability) to pay more for a given level of health outcomes, as 
well as greater demand for health, medical quality, convenience, and amenities.   
Suppose people vote on the level of health care services that should be provided by the 
public system.  The level of health spending chosen will correspond to that selected by the 
median voter (where median reflects level of preference for such spending).  Some voters 
will be willing to pay for more health care services than the median and will, at the median 
choice, have an unmet demand for health care services (Epple and Romano, 1996).  Since the 
income elasticity of demand for health care services is positive, these unsatisfied voters will 
mainly be higher income people who will be willing and able to purchase supplemental 
coverage to meet their excess demand.    
 
  
b.  Extended moral hazard 
Another feature of public health insurance systems that intensifies the willingness to pay 
for private services is the moral hazard that arises from insurance itself.   Public health 
insurance reduces the cost of care at the point of purchase.  In Canada, for example, most 
publicly-provided services are free to the consumer at the point of service. 
This reduction in prices at the point of service generates demand for insured services 
(moral hazard).  The demand for services paid for by public insurance, however, is 
complementary to many other services.  For example, the availability of free physician visits 
increases the demand for prescribed medications, even if those prescriptions are paid out-of-
pocket rather than by any insurance plan.  The availability of free hospital care increases the 
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surgical treatment increases the demand for speedy diagnostic tests that reveal the need for 
such surgical treatment.  Thus, the moral hazard generated by the public insurance systems 
spills over into the private market, generating a willingness to pay for complementary 
services.   
c.  Summary 
Publicly-financed health systems almost inevitably generate a willingness to pay for 
additional private services.  This demand arises because the political system will necessarily 
leave some people at the extremes of the preference distribution unsatisfied.  This general 
problem is aggravated by a prized feature of many public health insurance systems—free or 
low cost care at the point of service.  Together, these features generate a demand for services 
in a mixed private-public system that exceeds that generated by a purely public system and, 
in many scenarios, even exceeds that generate by a purely private system. 
 
2.  Externalities of Private Purchase 
How should society respond to the private purchase of health services?  That depends on 
the consequences for non-purchasers and for the system as a whole of this excess demand.  I 
next consider three areas where externalities of private purchase might exist:  health, 
aggregate expenditures, political and political economy. 
a.  Health 
  An obvious reason for limiting private purchases of health care by some people would be 
if such purchases directly made other people less healthy.  Greater spending by some people 
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consequences for those of lower status (Lynch et al., 2004). 
Socioeconomic differentials in health are large and appear to be growing.  Together with 
the positive income elasticity of health care demand, this implies that higher income people are 
both willing to pay more for health care services and are, on average, healthier than others.  The 
contribution of access to health care services to the observed socioeconomic differentials in 
health is not clear.  Differentials are growing in countries that have universal insurance coverage, 
as well as in those that do not.  Yet it seems plausible that using more or better medical care does 
play some part in the differential.  Concerns about the equity implications of differential access 
rest in large part on the existence of some meaningful connection between health care services 
and well-being.  If there were no such connection, it would be hard to see why public policy 
should prohibit people from wasting their money on useless consumption of private services.     
  Differential financial access to health care services may intensify the existing variation in 
health status between higher income and lower income people.  The difference would occur as 
higher income people became healthier faster than lower income people did.  This increase in 
inequality, however, would not directly make lower income people worse off.   
Some epidemiologists have gone further and argued that inequality (in income) itself –
relative poverty -- might directly generate a diminution in the health of lower income groups, 
holding constant the income of these individuals themselves (Health Canada, 1999).  Thus, this 
literature asks the same question in the context of health as I am asking in the context of health 
care services:  holding resources for lower income groups constant, does an increase in the 
resources available to higher income groups make lower income people worse off?   
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average health across nations.  Holding average income constant, countries with more equal 
income distributions do have better average health outcomes.  The implication of this cross-
sectional finding, however, is unclear.  Studies that examine changes in income inequality within 
a country over time find that these do not generate corresponding changes in health outcomes 
(even considering lagged effects).  Rather, those countries that have historically had more equal 
distributions of income are also countries that have tended to have better health.  The correlation 
between income inequality and health at the aggregate level appears to be an artifact of 
aggregation.  The most recent comprehensive review of the literature entirely rejects the 
proposition that relative income affects health in developed countries (Lynch et al., 2004).   
Income is a substantial determinant of health in its own right and can be a factor in 
generating unequal access to health services.  But the literature on relative income and health 
suggests that increasing the incomes of the richest does not directly harm the health of lower 
income groups
1.  To be sure, none of this literature directly examines whether increasing health 
access for the richest, while holding access constant for all others, harms the health of lower 
income groups.  Still, the literature generally rejects the proposition that private access to 
additional health services will generate negative health consequences for low income people 
through relative deprivation.  Thus, there is no evidence of a direct externality of private health 
care consumption on health. 
                                                 
1 Increases in the incomes of rich people may induce additional investment in technologies that treat illnesses 
affecting higher income groups.  Eventually, the benefits of these technological investments may “trickle down” to 
other groups.  It is theoretically unclear, however, whether this acceleration in technological development is socially 
optimal (see Baumgardner, 1991) and empirically unclear whether these “trickle down” benefits occur (Meara, 
Richards, and Cutler 2005; Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2003).   
  6b.  Expenditures/Availability of Services 
A second possible source of externalities is through effects of private spending on 
aggregate public expenditures – or, if spending does not adjust, on the level of services available 
in the public sector.  In evaluating the possible existence of such externalities, it should not be 
assumed that the existing level of public expenditures or the level of services is optimal.  
Increased private spending might lead to a warranted increase or decrease in public spending. 
Alternatively, if aggregate public spending is not permitted to increase (or decrease), any 
externalities generated through private spending will take effect on the quantity side of the public 
sector, reducing (or increasing) the availability of services for those who hold only public 
insurance.   The most direct way in which this change in availability is likely to occur is through 
a change in waiting times in the public system (as in Olivella, 2002).   
i.  Voting/Optimal Provision 
The public choice model of public provision of private goods (Epple and Romano, 1996) 
suggests that allowing supplemental private purchase will generally lead to a reduction in public 
expenditures.  The logic of this argument is that under a system that permits private purchase, 
higher income voters will prefer a lower level of public health care spending than otherwise, 
choosing to top up public spending with private purchases.  Permitting private purchase will 
move the winning median voter down the distribution of health care service demand.  
   The empirical evidence on private spending is consistent with this theoretical result.  
Tuohy, Flood, and Stabile (2004) find that the existence of private insurance tends to lead to 
future reductions in public spending in analyses across the OECD.   
A further implication of reduced public spending when private provision is permitted is 
that systems with mixed public and private payment will spend more on health care services (in 
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(often much higher) than median income.  This pattern suggests that under private supplemental 
purchase, the willingness to pay for private services, which depends on the average income of 
the population, will rise faster than the demand for public services (which depends on the income 
of the median voter) will fall.  Epple and Romano (1996) further show that if the willingness to 
pay for a good increases with an increase in income faster than with a decline in prices (as is 
likely the case in health care, see Manning and Marquis, 1996), purely public systems will spend 
less than either mixed or purely private health care systems.   
This increase in overall spending and reduction in public spending generally increases 
overall social welfare in voting models.  Both private purchasers and some public purchasers – 
those with low willingness to pay for health care services – are better off in the scenario where 
some private purchase is permitted
2.   Public purchasers with low willingness to pay for health 
care will benefit as services are reduced and either taxes fall or social spending is diverted to 
programs they value more highly. 
Models in which social planners choose the length of waiting times to maximize social 
welfare likewise generate the result that the optimal length of waiting lists in the public sector is 
generally greater if private services are available than if they are not (Olivella, 2002; Allard, 
Jarry, and Leger, 2007; Iversen, 1996)
3.   
                                                 
2 This argument should not be taken to imply that public provision of private goods is always welfare reducing.  
Public provision can improve welfare in situations of informational asymmetry.  For example, redistribution of a 
limited amount of child care through in-kind transfers may lead to lower distortions than would occur if 
redistribution took the form of cash assistance.  The in-kind transfer leads high and low ability people to self-select 
and reveal their endowments (Blomquist and Christiansen, 1999; Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982).  Similarly, 
universal public insurance can overcome adverse selection problems and generate efficiency gains. 
3 The general welfare consequences of permitting private insurance (rather than prohibiting it) vary depending on 
the organization of coverage and the parameters of these models.   
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Single payer health insurance systems can exploit their monopsony power to keep prices 
low.  Permitting the private purchase of services breaks up the monopsony and necessarily limits 
the ability of public price setters to keep prices down.   
This reduction in monopsony power may manifest itself in several ways.  Providers may 
negotiate more aggressively for higher rates when they have an alternative source of payment.  
They may shift service provision to the private sector, reducing the availability of services to 
patients in the public sector (Iversen, 1996; Morga and Xavier, 2001).  The general result will be 
that patients in the public sector will either receive fewer services (if spending is fixed) or have 
to pay more for the services they receive (if service levels are fixed).  In either case, taxpayers 
will be worse off because of the reduction in monopsony power. 
This pattern is exacerbated by provider agency.  In health care markets providers have 
more information than do consumers.  Consumers – patients – rely on providers to direct them to 
appropriate treatment and to guide their care.  In a situation where the public insurer regulates 
prices below the level paid in the private market, providers who work in both the private and 
public sectors have an incentive to shift demand toward the private sector.  In this scenario, 
providers will respond to the difference between monopsony prices and private prices by 
reducing their hours or level of service in the public sector, in favor of demand in the private 
sector (Iversen, 1996; Morga and Xavier, 2001).   
Whether the effect of private purchase on the supply of services to the public sector 
operates through prices or through quantities depends on the response of the public sector to 
competition in demand.  One alternative, used by the United States Medicare program and by 
most others, is to continually adjust (raise) prices paid by the public sector so that a substantial 
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effect of private purchase on prices paid in the public sector, many health care systems also 
require providers to choose whether to opt-into the public program.  Those who choose to opt-in 
may not accept private pay patients at all or may only accept private patients after they have 
supplied a pre-specified level of effort to the public program.        
An increase in expenditures through the elimination of monopsony power is generally 
viewed as welfare-improving.  Prices rise but overall use of services increases.  Moreover, 
providers gain and their gains also figure into calculations of social welfare.   
The analysis of welfare implications is complicated somewhat in the case of health care.  
Monopsony power reduces the cost of achieving some level of redistribution.  A decline in 
monospony power means that a greater level of distortionary taxes will be needed to achieve the 
same level of redistribution.  Holding the level of redistribution constant, allowing private 
purchases makes those who use additional services and health care providers better off, but 
makes taxpayers worse off. 
If the supply of services is completely insensitive to price (inelastic), the introduction of 
private insurance will drive up prices paid by the public sector (or reduce quantities purchased in 
that sector) without any offsetting increase in aggregate quantity.  In this situation, private 
purchase of services simply transfers funds from consumers to providers, redistributing scarce 
services among consumers, but with no implications for aggregate welfare.  This situation is, 
however, unlikely.  At the individual level, providers can increase their hours of work or delay 
retirement in response to increased marginal prices.  In aggregate, existing providers can invest 
in training to develop more highly compensated skills, changes can be made in existing 
  10processes of care to alter the skill mix needed for provision of specific medical services, and 
providers (particularly physicians) can immigrate from abroad.   
I now consider three scenarios under which public expenditures would rise in the 
presence of private purchase, and the general welfare consequences are unambiguously negative.  
In these scenarios, private purchasers may be made better or worse off, but non-purchasers are 
generally worse off because they are spending more for the same services (or receiving fewer 
services – facing longer waiting lists -- for the same level of spending). 
 
iii.  Insurance for Complementary Services  
Private spending may take several forms.  One common form of private spending in a 
publicly funded system is through the purchase of insurance that covers services complementary 
to those provided in the public system, such as pharmaceuticals. 
This insurance for services complementary to the public system generates moral hazard 
in the purchase of services it covers.  People with pharmaceutical coverage, for example, buy 
more drugs, whether pharmaceutical coverage is privately or publicly financed.  If the insured 
services are complementary to services covered by the public health insurance system, the 
private insurance also generates moral hazard in the public system.  Controlling for health status 
and other characteristics, for example, people with pharmaceutical coverage in Canada use about 
5% more physician visits than do those without such coverage (Stabile, 2001).  In the U.S. 
Medicare system, supplemental “Medigap” coverage covers coinsurance for services obtained in 
the public system.  Controlling for selection into coverage, people with Medigap coverage have 
public expenditures that are about 6% higher than do those without such private coverage 
(Atherly, 2002). 
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insurance unambiguously reduces social welfare.  Moreover, this increase in public spending is 
not captured in the premium on the private insurance policies themselves.  Instead, the increase 
in public spending constitutes a negative fiscal externality imposed on taxpayers who fund the 
public system (or to those without such coverage who now receive fewer publicly funded 
services). 
iv.  Private Purchases of Substitute Services 
A second form of private purchase is direct purchase of services – often high technology 
diagnostic testing services -- also offered in the public plan (using out-of-pocket payments, not 
insurance).  Private purchase of such services is often prompted by long waiting lists or 
insufficiently prompt or friendly access for publicly provided services.  These services are 
directly complementary to treatment services available in the public insurance system.  Waiting 
lists for access to these up-front services have the effect of acting as a gatekeeping device, 
rationing access to downstream treatment services (which may not exhibit waiting lists). 
In these contexts, private purchases enable people to substitute a price rationing 
mechanism – direct payment – for a non-price rationing system (waiting lists or inconvenience).  
People are willing to pay extra to move to the front of a queue or get additional physician 
attention because obtaining a service immediately or conveniently increases the value of the 
service (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984).  The extra value of these services means that 
willingness to pay for them will increase when price rationing substitutes for waiting list 
rationing.  People will not only obtain diagnostic tests faster when they can obtain them right 
away.  They will also use more such services.   
  12Moreover, the incentive to purchase diagnostic testing is itself increased by the presence 
of publicly-insured complementary services.  Increased use of diagnostic testing, in turn, will 
generate an increased demand for complementary publicly-provided services.  In medical care, 
complementaries abound (and substitutes are hard to find).  More and earlier diagnosis of disease 
will, almost inevitably, mean more treatment of disease and greater aggregate expenditures.  The 
increase in use of publicly-funded services induced by overriding gatekeeper rationing raises 
public expenditures and reduces welfare.  Here, too, private purchases impose a negative 
externality on taxpayers (or on non-purchasers of complementary services). 
 
v.  Full Replacement 
A final model of private purchase is one in which people buy private insurance in lieu of 
participating in the public health insurance system, as in Germany and the Netherlands.   In these 
cases, private insurance purchasers neither obtain public coverage nor pay premiums toward it  
(Den Exter, 2005; Greß, 2005).  A somewhat similar situation exists in the purchase of HMO 
coverage among U.S. Medicare beneficiaries, where beneficiaries pay the same taxes but opt out 
of the traditional fee-for-service program.   By design, these programs, operating entirely outside 
the public health care system, do not generate moral hazard within that system.  They may, 
nonetheless generate fiscal externalities to that system. 
The principal problem in the case of full replacement insurance is that healthier people 
are more likely to participate in private coverage than are similar people with health problems.  If 
private insurers may vary premiums to reflect health status, sicker people will be better off 
remaining in the public system.  If private insurers cannot vary premiums, they are likely to 
design their benefits in ways that “cream skim”  -- attracting healthy people and deterring sicker 
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that attract healthy buyers (discounted gym membership), or limiting benefits attractive to 
unhealthy buyers (including few oncologists on a provider panel). 
Studies of full replacement private insurance systems frequently find evidence of such 
favorable selection by private insurers (Greß, 2005).  In the case of US Medicare, for example, 
studies found that HMO purchasers were between 6-70% healthier, on average, than were those 
who remained in the traditional fee-for-service system (Mello et al., 2003).   
The distortions in benefit design that stem from the desire to select healthier buyers are 
themselves welfare reducing.  Moreover, when private insurers attract healthier than average 
people, this can often increase deficits in the public system.  Selection also reduces revenues in 
systems where private purchasers are exempted from progressive (e.g., payroll tax) financing 
(Greß, 2005).  Private coverage will tend to appeal most to those who paid the highest premiums 
(through payroll taxes) for public insurance, and who, because they are healthy, will face low 
premiums for private insurance.  The departure of this group from the public insurance pool will 
reduce revenues more than proportionally while decreasing costs less than proportionally.  
Again, the existence of private purchases will leave taxpayers, including non-purchasers, 
financially worse off (or obtaining fewer services for the same funds). 
c.  Well-being 
Even if private purchases of services do not lead to increased per capita expenditures in 
the public sector, they might still make non-purchasers worse off through their effects on 
satisfaction with the health care system at any given level of purchasing.  Here, externalities 
occur when the consumption of services by one person enters the utility function of another 
(Rice, 1998).  Although there is no a prior reason that such interdependencies should occur more 
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absence of universal housing, income, or food programs) suggests that this arena may be one in 
which we seek to “limit the domain of inequality” (Tobin, 1970). 
i.  Envy, Snob Effects, and Expectation Formation 
Utility-based arguments about externalities depend critically on the form of 
interdependencies in welfare.  The form of such interdependencies is not at all obvious.  For 
example, it is possible that people who do not purchase private services would be envious of the 
purchases of others and this would make them unhappy.  On the other hand, private purchases 
might equally generate pretentiousness or snob effects, where private purchasers were tickled by 
their purchases simply because others could not afford them (Dowd, 1999).   
Private purchases could affect well-being even without envy if they change people’s 
expectations about what constitutes appropriate service.  For example, people may be satisfied 
with receiving services within a “reasonable” amount of time.  The perceptions of what 
constitutes a reasonable amount of time, however, are likely to depend on typical practice.  If 
private purchasers are able to obtain services more rapidly, public purchasers may begin to view 
current service delivery patterns as unreasonable. 
As one of the first American health economics textbooks put it in 1961: 
When Americans speak of 'adequate medical care,' they do not have in mind any finite or 
defined quantity or quality.  The very concept is in a continuous state of flux with what is 
being achieved and is generally thought to be available. (Somers and Somers 1961). 
 
Some evidence of this proposition comes from analyses of the Commonwealth Fund 
survey of patients with health problems in six countries (Schoen et al., 2005).  In the countries 
where private insurance for publicly provided services is available (Australia, New Zealand, UK, 
and Germany), people with private insurance had shorter waits for surgical and specialist 
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are not paid by private insurance).  In each of these countries, people who waited longer for each 
of these services expressed lower levels of satisfaction with the overall health care system.  
Across countries, however, dissatisfaction with a given level of waiting time was lower the 
longer the average waiting time in the system.    
In a world where expectations of service are established by the observed average, 
bringing down the average will increase expectations.  This may affect well-being directly.  It 
may also change the choice of public spending levels.  If the median voter is a non-purchaser of 
private insurance, this increase in expectations will induce a demand for increased spending in 
the public sector.  In this case, private purchases induce a fiscal externality through changes in 
perceptions of adequacy. 
ii.  Equality 
Private purchases can introduce a second type of well-being externality if most people 
place some value on the degree of equality in the delivery of health care services.  A preference 
for some degree of equality means more than a belief that everyone should have access to some 
health care (Lindsay, 1969; Pauly 1971).  It also implies that the distance between the health care 
available to rich and poor should be held to some maximum, even when the care available to rich 
people improves.  Policy choices in the US, where care is certainly not equally provided, suggest 
that public preferences do fit this model (Glied, 1997). 
If equality is a value, increases in the amount of health care used by private purchasers 
must lead to a compensating increase in the public care available to those who cannot afford 
these purchases.  The market will not naturally generate such increases because equality is a 
public good, one which we can all benefit from, even if we do not all pay to make it happen.  
  16Equality may be a value universally held, but each individual has an incentive to free-ride on the 
public provision of equality – through increased subsidies or reduced consumption --  by others 
(Lindsay, 1969). 
d.  Summary  
Private purchases of care in a publicly-funded system are likely to have some direct and 
indirect effects on non-purchasers.  Private purchasers will probably not make non-purchasers 
less healthy than they would otherwise be.  They are likely to raise the prices paid by public 
purchasers, though this is not necessarily welfare-diminishing overall (and might even lead to 
improved efficiency in the public system). 
Most institutional configurations of private purchasing – supplemental insurance, direct 
purchases of rationed services, and substitute private insurance – will generate fiscal externalities 
on the public system.  In the first two cases, these externalities arise because private purchases 
compound the moral hazard effects inherent in the public insurance system.  In the case of 
substitute purchases, adverse selection means that per capita expenditures will rise in the 
presence of private insurance.  If substitute purchasers can also opt out of a progressive financing 
scheme, per capita revenues will drop in the presence of private insurance. 
Private purchases may affect people’s satisfaction with the public system and, indirectly, 
the costs of that system, if expectations of adequacy depend on a comparison of an individual’s 
experience and average experience.  Finally, private purchases will undoubtedly diminish the 
level of equality in health care delivery.  If equality of health care delivery is a widely-shared 
value, private purchasers will reduce this aspect of satisfaction among both purchasers and non-
purchasers     
  173.  Response to Externalities 
The existence of fiscal and well-being externalities associated with private purchase 
suggests that social welfare may be improved by limiting or controlling such purchases.  In an 
externality framework, the goal of such controls or limits should be to induce purchasers to 
internalize the external consequences of their purchases.  
a.  Fiscal Externalities 
Whatever the legal or ethical desirability of permitting private purchases, there is little 
economic justification for permitting private purchasers to impose direct fiscal externalities on 
the public system through moral hazard or adverse selection effects.  Theory and evidence 
suggest that existing private purchases impose such fiscal externalities.  These externalities 
would be exacerbated should private insurance for complementary or partial substitute services 
be permitted. 
Internalizing fiscal externalities associated with private purchases can be achieved by 
requiring private purchasers to compensate the public system for the costs they impose.  In most 
cases, the simplest way to do this is to impose a tax of appropriate magnitude on such purchases.   
Empirical evidence can be used to estimate the necessary magnitude of the tax in each 
case. Here, I illustrate this point in the Canadian context.  Stabile (2001) suggests that 
supplementary insurance for pharmaceuticals in Canada increases the demand for physician 
visits by 5%.  Per capita expenditures for physician visits are about $525 (Canadian Institute for 
Health Information, 2006).  A tax of 5% of this expenditure would come to about $25 per private 
purchaser of this type of supplemental coverage. 
Anderson et al. (2005) estimate that waiting list services account for about 3% of per 
capita health expenditures, or about $125.  This figure is not quite the same as the savings in 
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complementary public services may, themselves, not be rationed and therefore should not be 
included in this estimate.  Moreover, even in countries with both waiting lists and private 
insurance, most people obtain rationed diagnostic and related services in the public sector.  Thus, 
a tax of $125 on insurance to cover rationed diagnostic and related services would likely exceed 
the level needed to compensate for the externality generated through use of public services. 
In the case of full replacement coverage, the tax requires both a cost and revenue 
component.  The cost component would equal the difference between the individual’s expected 
costs of public coverage and the average cost of public coverage.  In the case of the U.S. 
Medicare program, a tax on HMO coverage calculated in this way would have assessed an 
average tax of about 10%, or about $400 per policy.  Compensation for lost tax revenue would 
depend on the degree of progressivity in public health insurance financing
4.   
b.  Well-Being and Equality Externalities 
It is not as obvious how to address the consequences of private spending associated with 
perceptions of well-being or with striving to maintain some degree of equality.  If relative 
allocations matter, the amount of redistribution needed increases as better off people spend more.  
Subsidizing ever-increasing amounts of redistribution becomes increasingly costly, especially 
when taxes are distortionary (Lindsay, 1969; Glied, 1997). 
The least cost means of achieving some degree of equality, where this is a public policy 
goal, is to combine subsidies for lower income people with limitations on the quantity of goods 
and services available to higher income people (Lindsay, 1969).  Subsidies impose costs through 
                                                 
4 An alternative model to address both of these problems would raise general tax revenue to finance risk-adjusted 
health insurance vouchers that could be used to pay for either public or (with supplementary payment) private 
insurance coverage (Pauly et al, 1992). 
  19taxation and redistribution.  Constraints on private purchase impose costs through the foregone 
consumer surplus from services not obtained.  Optimal policy balances these two costs at the 
margin.   
Spending by those with greater demand can be constrained through either prohibitions or 
taxation.  This form of limit maintains equality in health care service delivery by keeping the top 
of the distribution down.  The production of equality benefits those who value this feature, and 
harms those who would prefer to purchase private services.  Prohibitions, however, do not 
directly improve the well-being of non-purchasers.  Moreover, those who would otherwise have 
purchased health care retain the income they would otherwise have spent.  To the extent that they 
spend these funds on services complementary to health care (gym memberships, for example), 
the limitation on health care spending will not diminish the degree of socioeconomic inequality 
in health either. 
An alternative way to constrain health spending in this situation is to use the same 
externality logic as in the fiscal externality case and impose a tax on private spending, which 
may then be used to help finance the public system (Glied, 1997).  A tax serves several 
simultaneous functions in this context.  It increases the price of private health care services and 
reduces demand for them, preserving a degree of equality.  It permits private purchasers who 
place an extremely high value on health care services to continue purchasing them.  It draws 
money away from private purchasers, reducing the transfer of inequality to complementary 
services.  Finally, it generates revenues that can be used to increase health resources available to 
non-purchasers, without requiring new distortionary taxes.   
An absolute prohibition on private purchases translates into a tax rate of infinity.  This 
rate seems difficult to justify.  Our economy generates very large variations in incomes and 
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accept these variations, although they often include meaningful differences in the consumption 
of goods and services that have large, direct impacts on health (education, safer automobiles or 
housing, for example).  Our tolerance for inequality in so many other spheres weakens the 
argument that we should entirely prohibit private purchases of health services on grounds of 
inequality alone.   
How large would the tax need to be?  That depends on the extent of inequality in health 
care consumption viewed as acceptable and on assumptions about rates of participation in the 
private sector and the rate of growth of private and public spending.  Under generous 
assumptions about participation and private spending growth, for example, a tax rate of 30% 
would ensure that for the next 20 years, average spending by private purchasers was never more 
than 30% higher than average spending by non-purchasers.  A tax to compensate for externalities 
of well-being or inequality would supplement any taxes needed to adjust for fiscal externalities 
generated through the consumption of private services.  Since well-being and inequality effects 
are generated as readily through direct purchases as through insured purchases, the tax would be 
levied on private purchases however financed.   
4.  Conclusions and Implications 
The question of private health care in publicly-financed systems is fraught with talk of 
ethics and justice.  Economic analysis takes a different tack.  Economics admits that private 
purchases may be problematic in several ways.  It reframes the public policy question, however, 
from one of whether or not to prohibit such purchases at all to one of just how and why 
purchases are problematic. 
  21The results of this analysis suggest first, that private purchase does not have a direct 
impact on the health of non-purchasers.  Private purchases, do, however, have significant, though 
relatively small, fiscal implications for the public insurance system.  These fiscal implications 
have not been addressed in most public health insurance systems to date.  Private insurance, 
depending on its design, might exacerbate these fiscal externalities. 
Private purchases may also change people’s perceptions about the adequacy of the public 
system, generating increased demand for public services.  They may reduce social welfare if 
people value the degree of equality in itself.  Again, these effects are the consequence of private 
purchase, whether or not insurance is permitted.  I do not have  a precise measure of the 
empirical magnitude of these effects, but most components appear to be relatively small.   
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